Three years after 23andMe Inc. suffered a massive data breach exposing the personal information of nearly seven million customers, the legal fallout is still unfolding.
On Oct. 19, the California Attorney General’s Office announced a $6 million settlement resolving claims stemming from the breach and its challenge to the subsequent sale of customers’ genetic information in bankruptcy.[1] The announcement followed a Sept. 29 federal court decision and a July 14 settlement under which 42 state attorneys general secured an $18 million recovery from the company’s bankruptcy estate.[2]
These developments mark the latest chapter in a cautionary tale about how businesses approach data protection: Information security is assigned to technical teams, and privacy is assigned to lawyers and compliance personnel responsible for notices, consent and regulatory requirements. These teams must bridge this fundamental disconnect, as a cybersecurity failure can quickly become a privacy crisis, financial liability and, ultimately, a threat to the business itself.
The 2023 Breach
Contrary to what most would assume given the extensive damage, the 2023 breach was not the result of a sophisticated exploit. Attackers used credential stuffing, which involves trying usernames and passwords exposed in unrelated breaches, to obtain access to more than 18,000 accounts over approximately five months.[3] Optional features in 23andMe widened the aperture of potentially affected individuals to nearly seven million.
As such, the security question was whether the company had designed its authentication, account features and monitoring with the consequences of a compromised account in mind.
Regulators found that multifactor authentication was optional at the time, and fewer than 22% of customers had enabled it or single sign-on. Additional verification was not required to access or download raw genetic data from an account.[4] Regulators also identified shortcomings in password requirements and detection mechanisms for suspicious logins.[5] This is where product design, security engineering and privacy risk become inseparable and can potentially topple a company.
The breach did not single-handedly cause 23andMe’s bankruptcy, but it was a significant factor. In early bankruptcy filings, the company identified the litigation and government investigations generated by the 2023 security incident as among the challenges it faced.[6]
As any company that has experienced a breach knows, what might initially appear as a relatively short technical event can become quite costly. Litigation defense, investigations, settlements, operational remediation and reputational damage can continue long after access is contained and notices are provided to affected individuals.
Privacy Promises Versus Reality
23andMe repeatedly told its customers that they controlled their own genetic information. The company’s policies described how it handled data, while other consumer-facing materials emphasized privacy and control. But a notice cannot prevent unauthorized access or what happens when the company faces bankruptcy.
After the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2025, the court-appointed consumer privacy ombudsman urged the court to look beyond the formal privacy statement.[7] His report examined years of website statements, marketing assurances and privacy documents, questioning whether broader promises were consistent with transferring customer information without fresh permission, and noted that the formal privacy statement had not expressly mentioned bankruptcy until a 2022 amendment.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri took a narrower approach. It held that the relevant policy for its analysis was only the formal privacy policy in effect when the bankruptcy petition was filed.[8]
So, what does this split approach mean for companies? A company’s governance should be considered under both views while in good times, before any potential breach or whiff of bankruptcy.
A business should not assume that language in a privacy notice cures every representation made to customers. Nor should it assume that an accurate notice proves that technical controls deliver the protection consumers reasonably expect. Privacy communications and security capabilities should describe the same reality, and companies should plan ahead for potential risks.
Data as a Restricted Asset in Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy did not put an end to the privacy questions. In fact, 23andMe’s bankruptcy proceedings actually generated more questions than answers.
When 23andMe sought to sell its business, state regulators objected to transferring sensitive genetic information without consumers’ affirmative consent. The consumer privacy ombudsman recommended separate, express consent before a transfer, or, alternatively, consent before the purchaser could use the information. He also proposed stronger deletion rights, protections for deceased customers and a duty not to use data against individuals’ best interests.[9]
However, the bankruptcy judge declined to require new opt-in consent and narrowed the privacy focus of the proceedings.[10] The approved transaction would move assets into a newly formed subsidiary, whose equity would then be acquired by TTAM Research Institute, the nonprofit established by 23andMe co-founder and former CEO Anne Wojcicki.[11] The court reasoned that the particular arrangement did not trigger the consent requirements asserted under the genetic privacy statutes at issue.
But the court did not declare privacy law irrelevant to bankruptcy. It rejected the idea that Title 11 of the U.S. Code, Section 363, generally sweeps aside state restrictions on transferring personal information.[12]
The sale order required TTAM to honor existing privacy commitments and obtain any legally required consent before using personal information for new purposes.[13] It also incorporated negotiated commitments involving notice, deletion rights, cybersecurity controls, regulatory reporting, oversight and restrictions on future transfers.
At the end of the day, consumers did not receive the veto over the transfer that some regulators and the consumer privacy ombudsman sought, but they did receive enforceable protections governing what happened next, including the ongoing right to delete, which is similar to the European view regarding the right to be forgotten.
The Long Tail of the Breach
While the transaction for the sale itself closed on July 14, 2025, litigation over the breach and sale continued. An appeal challenging approval of the sale was dismissed in September, but did not resolve the substantive state genetic-privacy questions on their merits, thus still leaving open questions about privacy.
The financial reckoning was more concrete. Just between the various regulators and litigation, without even any consideration of other costs, the breach cost $74 million: a $46.75 million consumer class settlement, an $18 million multistate recovery, California’s separate $6 million settlement and a £2.31 million ($3.05 million) U.K. fine.
$74 million is a very large price tag for any company and demonstrates the familiar costs of inadequate security: enforcement exposure, civil claims and years of legal expense. These outcomes do not mean every company suffering a breach will face insolvency, but they do show why breach risk belongs to broader risk management, not exclusively in the information technology budget. Any risk factor with this high of a potential price tag is one that companies should be thinking about from a broad, whole-of-company approach.
Additionally, a company’s liabilities do not simply vanish when the business is sold, even in bankruptcy. Instead, they may continue to be litigated even though the information at the center of the dispute exists under a new owner. In this case, the original entity no longer has the assets, yet it continues to deal with the regulatory fines.
Considering the Whole Picture
23andMe’s experience makes a persuasive case for an integrated governance model. Privacy teams should be involved when engineers design account relationships, download functions and authentication requirements, not just when the company needs a notice explaining them.
This concept of privacy by design is not new, but it’s still one that can be difficult to implement, as it requires buy-in across a company at the highest and lowest levels.
Security teams should understand the representations made in marketing materials and consent flows, because those representations influence the standards consumers and regulators will expect the business to meet. When cross-functional teams actually work and communicate well with each other, with the support of top management, companies generally end up with more effective and productive results. The privacy realm is even more so, as it is truly a cross-functional risk.
Privacy promises should be consistent across the enterprise. Businesses should review marketing claims, FAQs, product interfaces and consent language alongside their privacy notices, avoiding absolute assurances that operational practices cannot support. Records of prior privacy practices should be maintained, and a review process should be established before public-facing claims change.
The same cross-functional mindset is needed when incidents occur. An investigation should not stop once it has identified an exploited credential or patched a vulnerability. It should ask what information became accessible through product features, whether related individuals were affected, what promises the company made about the data, whether consent records and retention choices matter, and whether consumers and regulators are receiving a complete, supportable account of the event.
Senior leadership also needs a clearer view of the financial consequences, including a consideration of privacy compliance during acquisitions, restructurings or bankruptcy. A board that reviews cybersecurity through technical metrics alone may miss the cumulative exposure created by breach litigation, regulator investigations and the future costs of retaining sensitive information.
Conversely, a privacy program measured only by whether its notices satisfy statutory disclosure requirements may miss the security decisions that determine whether those notices remain credible. The promises a company makes about personal information today can have significant consequences for what it can do with that information tomorrow.
Finally, companies should reconsider the value of keeping information indefinitely. Genetic data may be unusually immutable, but the broader principle applies to financial, health, location and other sensitive records.
Information retained for potential future use is also information that must be secured, subject to deletion rights and potentially dealt with when the business changes. Minimization and workable deletion procedures are not only compliance obligations but can reduce the scale of an eventual crisis.
Conclusion
The 23andMe story began with a security failure, continued through questions about privacy promises and consumer control, and culminated in a bankruptcy sale and settlements.
The central lesson of 23andMe is not that a privacy policy was poorly worded or that one security tool was missing. It is that privacy and security describe two sides of the same obligation: A company that asks people to trust it with sensitive information must be able to protect that information and remain accountable for it when things go wrong.
Companies that can think through these issues in a consolidated and thoughtful manner will be better served if — or when — something does not go according to plan.
[3] https://www.23andme.org/blog/articles/addressing-data-security-concerns/
[4] https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2025/bg_23andme_250617/
[5] https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2025/bg_23andme_250617/
[6] Declaration of Matthew Kvarda in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions, In re: 23andMe Holding Co., No. 25-40976, at 2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2025) https://files.lbr.cloud/public/2025-03/Declaration%20of%20Matthew%20Kvarda.pdf?VersionId=hbWk.CgRiRHbKLGtlSb9JgupCiluc.FU.
[7] Richards, Neil M., Report of Prof. Neil Richards, the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman in the 23andMe Bankruptcy Case, p. 28-45 (June 11, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5476672.
[8] In re: 23andMe Holding Co., et al, case no. 25-40976-357, Memorandum Opinion (June 27, 2025), https://www.moeb.uscourts.gov/sites/moeb/files/opinions/25-40976_BK_01_23andMe.pdf (“Memorandum Opinion”).
[9] Richards, Neil M., Report of Prof. Neil Richards, the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman in the 23andMe Bankruptcy Case, p. 105-111 (June 11, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5476672.
[10] Memorandum Opinion, pp. 5-6.
[11] Memorandum Opinion, pp 20-27, 35-37.
[12] Memorandum Opinion, pp. 8-12.
[13] In re: 23andMe Holding Co., et al, case no. 25-40976-357, Order (I) Approving (A) The Debtors’ Entry Into The Sale Transaction Documents, (B) The Sale To The Purchaser Of The Acquired Assets Free And Clear Of All Liens, Claims, Interests, And Encumbrances, And (C) The Assumption And Assignment Of Certain Executory Contracts And Unexpired Leases; (Ii) Authorizing The Debtors To Consummate Transactions In Connection Therewith; And (Iii) Granting Related Relief (June 27, 2025), p. 171-176 https://business.cch.com/CybersecurityPrivacy/23andmeorder.pdf (“Sale Order”).
