The New Jersey Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Allen, Docket No. A-7-25 (July 29, 2026) resolves a question that has quietly lingered in New Jersey criminal practice for decades: what standard governs when a defendant seeks a new trial because the state failed to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant?
In a unanimous opinion authored by Associate Justice Rachel Wainer Apter, the Court reaffirmed that claims arising under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) are governed by the “reasonable probability” standard and not the more demanding standard applicable to newly discovered evidence under State v. Carter, 86 N.J. 300 (1981). Although the Court ultimately affirmed the defendant’s conviction, its decision provides long-needed guidance by clearly separating two standards that New Jersey courts had too often treated as interchangeable.
The distinction is more than semantic. It affects how defense counsel should frame post-conviction claims, how prosecutors evaluate disclosure obligations, and how courts analyze motions for a new trial, and reaffirms that not every failure to disclose evidence by the state amounts to a constitutional violation.
Brady and Carter
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Brady v. Maryland in 1963, prosecutors have had a constitutional obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt. A Brady violation requires three elements: the evidence must be favorable to the accused, the State must have suppressed the evidence, and the suppression must have prejudiced the defense. The prejudice inquiry is known as the materiality requirement. This requirement asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. As the Court explained, this standard arose from the Strickland v. Washington ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
New Jersey recognizes a separate doctrine for newly discovered evidence. In State v. Carter, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on evidence discovered after trial must show, among other things, that the evidence would probably change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted. New Jersey courts have generally interpreted “probably” to mean more likely than not.
Although these standards were developed for different purposes, they frequently became blurred in practice, and not just by practitioners. New Jersey courts occasionally quoted Brady and Carter interchangeably, importing Carter’s more demanding standard into cases involving evidence the prosecution failed to disclose. That overlap created uncertainty about the burden defendants faced when asserting Brady claims.
State v. Allen
On July 29, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court finally resolved the confusion between Brady and Carter and the materiality standard under each. Defendant Yusef Allen was convicted after a jury trial in 1999 for murder, which occurred on October 15, 1997. The State’s case rested largely on the testimony of a single witness, Ruby Waller. Waller testified at Allen’s trial about the murder. During the trial, Waller testified about her prior convictions.
Many years after Allen’s conviction, the defense discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a 1991 cooperation plea bargain under which Waller had received favorable treatment in exchange for testifying against one of her co-defendants. During his direct appeal and on post-conviction relief, Allen argued that the undisclosed cooperation agreement constituted impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed under Brady.
In February 2022, long after his conviction, Allen filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence under Carter, maintaining that the State’s failure to disclose Waller’s corporation agreement was clearly material and would have changed the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, appellate counsel argued that the motion should have been brought under Brady and not Carter. The Appellate Division concluded that the motion court erred in evaluating Allen’s claims under Carter, rather than Brady, but the error was harmless because “we see no practical difference between the materiality/harmless error elements set forth in the Brady and Carter formulations.” The Court then granted Allen’s petition for certification limited to the proper measure of materiality for a Brady claim, including whether the Brady and Carter standards are the same.
The Court concluded that Brady and Carter establish two distinct materiality standards serving different purposes.
The Court affirmatively held that Brady claims arise when the State is in possession of exculpatory evidence and that evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. By contrast, Carter addresses evidence that does not originate from the prosecution’s failure to disclose information; Carter arises from the defense possessing the newly discovered evidence. As such, a defendant must satisfy a more demanding standard: that the newly discovered evidence would probably change the jury’s verdict.
The Court focused on the language itself. A “probability” may suggest one level of certainty, but a “reasonable probability” reflects a deliberately less demanding standard. The modifier changes the inquiry. Brady asks whether the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the verdict, not whether acquittal would have been the more likely outcome. Carter, however, looks to whether the evidence “probably” would have changed the verdict, which means “more likely than not.”
Although the Court rejected the Appellate Division’s interpretation of Brady and Carter, it nevertheless affirmed the denial of Allen’s motion for a new trial because the undisclosed cooperation agreement did not satisfy Brady’s materiality requirement since there was no reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the outcome of the trial. In short, even under the more forgiving Brady standard, Allen could not prevail.
Practical Lessons for Litigants
The Court’s analysis in Allen finally aligns New Jersey law with longstanding federal Brady jurisprudence while clarifying that Carter continues to govern newly discovered evidence obtained from sources outside the prosecution. Allen further provides meaningful guidance for both defense attorneys and prosecutors.
For defense counsel, the decision reinforces the importance of (1) identifying the source of newly discovered evidence, (2) characterizing the motion and how that characterization impacts the legal analysis, and (3) citing the correct standard. If favorable evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, the claim should be analyzed under Brady’s reasonable probability standard rather than Carter’s more demanding newly discovered evidence test.
At the same time, Allen demonstrates that merely identifying undisclosed impeachment evidence will not be enough. Courts will continue to examine whether the suppressed information bears a genuine and logical relationship to the witness’s credibility and whether its disclosure would have undermined confidence in the jury’s verdict.
For prosecutors, Allen serves as another reminder that Brady’s disclosure obligations remain broad and ongoing. But the decision also clarifies that when evidence truly originates outside the State’s possession, Carter—not Brady—governs the analysis.
A Welcome Clarification
Although Allen did not produce a new trial for the defendant, it provides something almost as valuable for practitioners: clarity. Distinguishing between Carter and Brady should simplify future litigation over motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Further, for many years in New Jersey prior to Allen, Brady and Carter occupied overlapping territory in New Jersey caselaw, creating uncertainty about which materiality standard applied when defendants sought relief based on newly discovered evidence. Allen finally draws a clear doctrinal line. Going forward, lawyers and courts alike should resist treating Carter and Brady as interchangeable. Allen makes clear that they are not, and that distinction will shape how Brady claims are litigated in New Jersey for years to come.
Reprinted with permission from the August 5, 2026 edition of the “New Jersey Law Journal” © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or [email protected].
*Ariana Astafa, a summer associate not yet admitted to the bar, contributed to this article.